Evaluation

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Evaluating Governance Programs

Report of a Workshop
8 April 1999

held at the
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Ottawa, Canada

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Evaluating Governance Programs
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Introduction

The goal of this one-day workshop was to exchange views from different perspectives on the monitoring and evaluation of externally funded governance programs. Participants included governance and evaluation practitioners, agency representatives, and academicians. The workshop sought to arrive at consensus on the practical and policy issues related to improving the implementation and reporting of governance interventions.

The genesis of the workshop was a review of the Program on Governance (PoG) in South Africa, a support program funded by the Canadian government to assist the government of the Republic of South Africa. As this is the best documented Canadian experience in this field, it served as a solid point of departure for discussion. It was complemented by experiences in other countries and other types of governance interventions.

This account of the meeting summarizes discussions around the key themes of the meeting and concludes with main areas of follow-up recognized at the workshop.

The report includes 6 annexes. The first two presentations of the day, by Dean Stephen Toope and Dr Al Johnson are included, as these were referred to by participants throughout the day. A literature review was conducted for the workshop by Dr Ilan Kapoor (Annex 3). Annex 4 is the Annotated Agenda used by the workshop. A list of participants is appended as Annex 5. Finally, Annex 6 lists the documents received by participants before and during the workshop.

What are we trying to achieve when we put in place support for good governance programs?

Definition

1. It was clearly recognized by the workshop that sound and sustainable social and economic development is unattainable without good governance. Governance as a term is increasingly problematic as it is overused and has become vague in usage. It has some aspects of "flavour of the month" in development assistance, and because it is defined in broad terms, it tends to be defined according to the previous programming experience of participants.

2. The workshop struggled with the definition of governance, recognizing its importance as a basis for determining what comprises a governance program and for how it is evaluated. While there was general agreement with the definition as stated in the annotated agenda of the meeting (Annex 4), and emerging from the work of the Institute on Governance (IoG), there was also a recognition that this definition is incomplete and does not offer a solid basis for designing governance interventions, or for assessing their performance.

> ***Governance comprises the institutions, processes and traditions which determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say.***

3. The workshop reflected different perspectives on this definition. From one perspective it was noted that governance is simply the act of governing, and that this should be the working definition from which all governance programming activities are defined. For others, the IoG definition proved adequate, so long as several points were made clear:

   3.1 Governance programming is an expression of the Canadian foreign policy goal of supporting democratic development. This has become a central policy agenda for both the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The workshop noted some contradictions in the application of this foreign policy agenda to governance programming:
   - a) in the support of governance programming in authoritarian states;
   - b) in assisting NGOs to promote democratic development in an "unwilling" state; and
   - c) in making judgements about how much democracy is "enough".

   3.2 This foreign policy agenda highlights one of the main challenges of governance programming: remaining cognizant of the values which underly the support provided to recipients. It was noted that the definition of governance is weakened

if the values which guide governance programming are not explicit. Participants referred to this as a normative gap between some of the models of governance work and the norms which inform them.

3.3 That governance programming relates not only to the government sector, but also to civil society and the private sector should be explicit. Initiatives may have an emphasis in one sector or another, but should be cognizant of all sectors. Good governance is unlikely to emerge when one sector is developed to the detriment of others.

4. For still others, the definition of governance needed to be much more specific about the role and focus for the private sector and civil society. The following points were made:

4.1 Governance programming and evaluation to date has tended to be quite narrow. It has tended to focus primarily on public sector management and performance, thereby ignoring the role and contributions of civil society in a country's governance. And even within the public sector, emphasis has tended to be placed primarily on its effectiveness and efficiency (economic and institutional criteria), not on its legitimacy and accountability (political criteria).

4.2 Reference was made in the discussion to a more detailed definition of governance programming, such as that used by UNDP:
Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels. Governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations... Governance includes the state, but transcends it by taking in the private sector and civil society. All these are critical... the state creates a conducive political and legal environment. The private sector generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction – mobilizing groups to participate in economic, social and political activities... governance can no longer be considered a closed system. (Governance for Sustainable Human Development, a UNDP Policy document, January 1997.)

5. The workshop agreed that the purpose of governance programming in the end is to strengthen institutional capacities to govern, leading to more effective policies and services in an increasingly democratic environment.

6. The workshop did not reach a consensus on the definition of governance and governance programming. The broad character of the definition is reinforced in the point made in the workshop that virtually all development activities could be assessed for their influence on governance. <u>These considerations reinforce the central importance of clarity in the criteria defining governance interventions.</u>

Characteristics

7. The workshop noted that ownership of the governance program by the recipients is a *sine qua non* condition before any change can be institutionalized. By ownership is meant client consent and control of governance programming. The issue here is one of clarity of roles in governance programming: the role of foreign advisors needs to remain precisely advisory. In the case of the workshop itself, participation by recipients would have enhanced and enriched discussions. In view of these points, suggestions were put forth on the need for a recipient forum.

8. It was recognized that donor interventions are both modest and only a part of a larger change being carried out in any society. It is therefore recommended that governance programs have modest expectations of their achievements in this field.

9. Although the definition of governance remains elusive, the PoG reflects the key characteristics of successful governance initiatives. These characteristics were supplemented by the discussions to encompass the following:

   9.1 Ownership and commitment in the recipient country can be clearly recognized both at the top of the system and at the level of the intervention.

   9.2 There is a realistic commitment of time and resources by both the donor and the recipient to the defined task.

   9.3 The stature and expertise of the Canadians providing support through the project is key.

   9.4 The project team is responsive to emerging needs.

   9.5 There is strong (and ongoing) understanding of the context in which work is carried out; this includes a respect for existing governance norms in a society.

   9.6 A focus on "Key people - Key places - Key processes", permits one to identify critical issues and critical actors in order to meet the goals of the project; influence is a key tool in this regard.

   9.7 There is a compatibility between partners, that is among the recipients and advisors in any governance intervention. The level of compatibility will determine the direction and level of success.

   9.8 Good governance programs foster practitioner exchange and mentoring.

10. Indicators used to assess governance interventions became an important subject of discussion. The discussion can be characterized in the current debate between:

10.1 the use of the fungibility of money (see the 1998 David Dollar report for the World Bank on "Assessing Aid"), as the principle indicator of good governance. Fungibility is increasingly proposed as the key decision factor in whether or not to support a regime; and

10.2 the view that it is possible to identify islands of efficiency within a corrupt regime. These islands of efficiency may emerge as key building blocks in the reform of that system.

11. For some participants, the essence of technical assistance in good governance is found in improving practice within existing systems. For others, effective technical assistance implies influencing the structures of government.

12. While many governments are only beginning to develop a capacity for making incremental changes, they are feeling pressured by globalization to make sweeping changes. Aside from the bilateral influences in governance support, there are an increasing number of supranational agencies affecting governance. Increasing social and economic pressures are also important. This confluence of factors was compared with the period of the Marshall Plan, following the Second World War. At this time major institutions such as the OECD, the UN family and the European Community were created, and the Allies profoundly influenced governance aspects of reconstruction in Japan and Germany. While some important factors of success in the Marshall Plan were highlighted in the discussion (such as the sustained nature of the intervention and the fact that it was clear who were the winners and losers), it was noted that a serious look at the factors behind the success of the Marshall Plan, from a governance perspective, could give many insights into what needs to be done now.

13. These points on the definition and characteristics of governance programming highlight the conclusion that there is no one model of "good governance", nor of governance programming. Hence, there can be no single model of governance evaluation. Good governance is affected by geography, politics, culture and economy. The workshop insisted that the key is being clear on the context, the goals and the players, before constructing an intervention or an evaluation.

How can the various actors know if and why they are moving towards the results they want?

14. The notion of causality in governance programming was rejected; there are too many variables at play. Evaluation of governance work is not scientific *per se*. It must nevertheless be rigorous and make use of data to reach conclusions or to support the initiative. Good practitioners periodically assess the activities for which they are responsible, to evaluate whether or not the program is on the right track, or how a particular approach/intervention might be refined.

15. Governance as a whole cannot be evaluated by outsiders as outsiders cannot credibly evaluate the government of a country. Ways must therefore be found to identify the level at which evaluation of governance can take place. It was suggested that this task is best achieved in cooperation with those governing and being governed.

16. A revolution in thinking affects governance programming: a metaphor which resonated with the participants was that instead of thinking of programming in the traditional ballistic missile sense of "*ready-aim-fire*", programming in governance needs to be thought of from the more complex and cybernetic perspective of the cruise missile: "*ready-fire-aim-aim.*" This means that evaluation must have the capacity to monitor adjustments and changes in direction over time. Just as governments can no longer manage change incrementally, but must take account of pressures imposed by sweeping global changes, evaluation cannot monitor progress along a simple baseline, because the ground keeps shifting.

17. Most participants felt that the work which has been done to date in governance programming is ripe for evaluation. A significant number of initiatives have been undertaken in the field of governance and many experiments have been initiated both domestically and internationally. A new generation of work in this field is about to be undertaken. Therefore, research and evaluation on what has been achieved would be useful inputs to planning this new generation of activities. Evaluation should look at three things:

    17.1 what worked, and why;
    17.2 what didn't work, and why not; and
    17.3 the unintended consequences of our activities.
    (In an example cited to the workshop, from an apparently successful project in Guatemala to support the development of indigenous peasant coops throughout the 1970s, all was destroyed during the military repression of the early 1980s.)

18. The policy objectives of governance programming are clear – to support increasingly effective government in emerging democracies – but not enough is known about the **what**

and the **how** of doing it, and this could be effectively assisted by research and evaluation.

19. Evaluation does not stand alone in a review of governance programs. It was noted that governance work is frequently highly political in nature. It therefore requires ongoing commitment and recognition of its importance by the relevant governing bodies in both the recipient and donor countries.

20. The workshop repeatedly emphasized the need for a strategic direction to a governance program, even though factors such as the politics of governance, and the necessity for openness and flexibility at the programmatic level, mean that you cannot pre-determine the course. This strategic direction is key to the evaluation of governance programming and sets the context within which to evaluate the strategies adopted. It was proposed to the meeting that as a management and learning tool, evaluation should be seen as a way to negotiate different versions of reality and thereby improve our approximate knowledge.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of existing mechanisms for generating and applying this knowledge?

From technocratic evaluation to learning-based evaluation

21. Historically, evaluation has been technocratic in application. That is, it has been a set of tools narrowly applied by experts, without necessarily serving the needs of the participants. The primary client was always the funding agency, which sought to know if the program it funded was "good" or not. Throughout the day, discussion returned to the point that there is a need to acknowledge up-front the value-ladenness and political nature of evaluation, and of governance evaluation in particular. This stems from the multiple and differing interests (socio-economic, cultural, moral) of the various partners and clients involved in any governance program or evaluation. The failure to acknowledge and incorporate this value-laden and political dimension into evaluation is what has led to the "blueprint" and "technocratic" approaches of the past, in which the inflexible models and priorities of some clients (usually the donors) have been imposed on all the others.

22. There was widespread agreement in the workshop that technocratic approaches are not useful in the evaluation of governance programming and that there is a need to develop new ways to evaluate which are more oriented to learning. There is a danger in the systematization of knowledge, and the creation of information systems, which can take a good idea and compartmentalize the data to the point it is no longer useful (*good ideas put in systems often produce idiocy*). In these earlier technocratic systems, there were no incentives, such as placing a high value on applying learning. The trend to learning through evaluation was highlighted in two discussions in the workshop, one on

participation (paragraph 23) and one on the application of tools (paragraphs 24 & 25).

23. The literature review by Dr Kapoor opened a rich debate on participatory evaluation and its potential in assessing progress in governance programming. Participation means the introduction of diverse perspectives and needs which have to be managed. For some at the workshop, participation in evaluation by the stakeholders was crucial to ownership (client consent and control) and use of the results of evaluation. A note of caution was also raised however: a key ingredient of participation is the equitability of power between groups/partners; it is the absence of such equitability that causes the risk of reinforcing a bias in the evaluation towards the special interests of some groups, rather than permitting a more objective overview of the activity. For others, participation made the evaluation more honest. For example, in the recent Rwanda evaluation and the Sahel evaluation undertaken within the OECD, the only way for the range of participants involved to protect their reputations was to be quite open and direct in their description and interpretation of events.

24. Consistent with this perspective, the workshop observed that while evaluation can operate as a *disciplined criticism of an activity*, it runs the risk of becoming a screen between the project and reality when performance criteria are set without adequate knowledge of the circumstances being addressed. Traditional evaluation approaches which demand the application of the same tool and logic model to all initiatives were rejected as irrelevant and possibly destructive. It was also noted that some of the evaluation tools in use today (such as Logical Framework Analysis – LFA, Results Based Management – RBM, and Indicators-based studies) were developed with a different purpose, primarily the evaluation of discrete, blueprint-type projects (i.e., infrastructure projects) and have little fit with complex and iterative, governance program agendas.

25. The workshop was also reminded that the tools are not the problem. Rather the application of these tools must be modified to meet diverse and complex needs and they must be customized in different settings. Examples of some attempts which have been made to use the LFA and other tools in a manner more consistent with the needs of governance programming were raised. However, the application of these tools through RBM appears to contradict this move to a more iterative and flexible approach to the use of LFA and other tools and has resulted in a more rigid form of LFA.

26. One of the challenges for donor evaluations will be not only to move towards the acceptance of supplementing quantitative with qualitative information, but also accepting and relying on personal stories and narrative accounts of clients/beneficiaries. Part of the challenge here is moving away from the mind set of only accepting as authoritative numeric data and the so-called "objective" and "impersonal" assessments of the evaluator(s). Another challenge will be making the presence/absence (or the institutionalization) of "learning" and "participation" in governance activities itself a criteria for evaluations, so that projects are made accountable not just to results but to

what has been learned and who has participated in that learning process.

The importance of criteria and clarity of purpose

27. The selection of criteria for evaluation was presented as crucial to the definition of new approaches to governance evaluation. While most agencies and people in the governance field tend to list many of the same general criteria, there is insufficient attention paid to ensuring coherence and consistency between donors and recipients in understanding how these criteria apply in each setting. This was reinforced in the description of PoG's success in terms of its persistence, ongoing field presence and the flexibility of its key staff. Evaluation criteria have to be considered in each case by the recipients in partnership with those providing technical assistance. Unless that clarity is sought, the evaluator determines the criteria independently and, as noted by Dean Toope in his opening remarks, wields enormous influence far beyond the scope of evaluation. This aspect of the discussion was related by the workshop quite closely to the issue of tools noted in paragraphs 24 & 25 above. Without a clear sense of criteria the data collection tools are often inappropriately applied.

28. In his summary, Dr Armstrong stressed the importance of criteria for good governance. First, in terms of the **activities and programs** to foster good governance (courses, mentoring, publication, etc.), there is already a clear understanding of the nature and focus of these activities. A number of tools and methods exist for evaluating the quality and success of activities. Second, in terms of the assessment of the **institutions** and processes supporting good governance (legislatures, judiciaries, financial accountability, service delivery mechanisms, etc.), the nature and importance of institutional capacity building is clear, and tools are in place for assessment in this dimension. A third element of importance in governance programs is the **relationships** to ensure synergy and sustainability (central and local government, inter-institutional relations, civil society organizations, network support, etc.). In this domain, as well, tools for evaluating networks and partnerships exist. Further, there is a clear understanding of their importance and their relationships to both the development of institutional capacities, and the delivery of successful activities. The fourth and final element of governance projects proposed, is that of the **criteria** for good governance. Here, there is more uncertainty. The terms used to describe the criteria (for example, transparency, accountability, rule of law, participation, level of corruption, etc.), have a particular meaning in the Canadian context, well understood by Canadians. Therefore, these words have been used quite casually in the design of governance initiatives, forgetting that the application of these terms in a new environment has to deal with the embedded values, history and the capacities of a system. Defining these criteria therefore would entail a dialogue between donor and recipient, and a clear understanding of the context in which program delivery is to take place. This framework for thinking about the major elements of a governance project, is presented as Figure 1, page 10, but was not discussed for reasons of time.

Major Interrelated Elements of Governance Projects
Developed by Jim Armstrong, April 8, 1999

Criteria *(for good governance)*	Activities & Programs *(to foster good governance)*	Relationships *(to ensure synergy & sustainability)*	Institutions *(and processes supporting good governance)*

▪ Transparency
▪ Accountability
▪ Participatory
▪ Rule of Law
▪ Level of Corruption
▪ Equity
▪ Security
▪ Predictability
▪ Effective Responsible Policy
▪ Incentives for Sustainability
▪ Decentralization
▪ Political Leadership, Support & Commitment
▪ Efficiency
▪ Legitimacy
	▪ Courses & Workshops
	▪ Mentoring
	▪ Study Tours
	▪ Coaching/Partnering/Twinning
	▪ Learning from Alliances
	▪ Publications
	▪ Diagnostic Tools, Gap Analysis, Organizational Planning, Institutional Establishment, Change Management, and other Consulting-like interventions
		▪ Government & Governed
		  ▪ Level of Trust
		  ▪ Degree of Participation
		▪ Central & Local Governments
		▪ Inter-Institutional
		▪ Inter-Sectoral
		▪ Civil Society Organizations
		▪ Inter-Development Agency
		▪ Network Support
		▪ Recipient Ownership
			▪ Legislatures
			▪ Judiciaries
			▪ Security (Police, Customs, Military)
			▪ Electoral Bodies and Systems
			▪ Financial Accountability
			  ▪ Financial Management
			  ▪ Audit Regime
			  ▪ Auditor General
			▪ Markets
			▪ Service Delivery Mechanisms
			▪ Professional Public Service
			  ▪ Reformed
			  ▪ Efficient
			  ▪ Policy Capacity
			  ▪ Meritorious
			  ▪ High Level of Integrity
			▪ Local Governments
			▪ Public Participation
			▪ Individuals

TARGETED GOALS & OBJECTIVES *Need to be "home grown"—carefully developed and refined with recipient to reflect their circumstances and needs. Need flexibility and responsiveness. In context of a country's needs, culture and history.*	***IMPACT ASSESSMENTS (E.G. EEPSEA)*** *Activities and Programs as a means to an end, part of a wider set of clear objectives rather than supply-sided approaches.*	***DATA RESEARCH, SURVEYS, INTERVIEWS*** *Promote co-operation, involve different types of organizations; assess ownership.*	***INSTITUTIONAL ASSESMENT TOOLS*** *Emphasize organizational procedures, structures and cultures.*

Figure 1

29. Throughout the day, the workshop reminded itself that some modesty is necessary in undertaking governance activities, as well as in their evaluation. It recognized that governance programming is not a smooth exercise, and can sometimes be wrought with contradictions. Coming to terms with this permits governance programming and evaluations to set modest, realistic and flexible objectives; failure to do so can lead to unrealistic expectations and a breakdown in communication between partners.

30. It was noted that Canada has not succeeded in institutionalizing an adequate level of evaluation of its own domestic governance initiatives. Therefore, the workshop stressed that prudence is needed in the standards set by one country for other countries. Some of the recipients who have been assisted through Canadian governance programs highly appreciate that assistance and have noted that they would like to give something back to Canada. This would be a useful confirmation of the innovations they have developed and be useful for Canada as well in dealing with our own challenges in this arena.

31. While the workshop emphasized the need to use evaluation for learning, it also recognized the importance of the accountability function of evaluation. For some participants, these two were quite separate functions and activities. For others, learning was paramount and accountability was left to the internal reporting function; for others learning and accountability are intertwined in good management. The workshop did not see evaluation as a policing tool, but rather as a tool for dialogue among the interests and for learning, both of which need to be better articulated in the design and conduct of evaluations – particularly at the project design stage.

32. The issue of evaluation is a complex one. The example was raised of the Norwegian approach to evaluating governance programs. In order to address the complexity of the program and build a solid knowledge base for evaluation, teams are used. The teams are sent to the field for up to six months to develop an in-depth knowledge of the program and the context. While this approach was seen as laudable, the workshop noted that Canada cannot afford this approach in most of its work. However, within the OECD, there is an increasing trend to collaborative evaluation by several member states of their interventions in the governance field. Through participation in these joint undertakings, Canada could gain some of the advantages of a more in-depth approach and could also contribute to strengthening governance evaluations across the OECD system.

Next steps

33. It was concluded that the need for rigorous reflection on the performance of governance programming is clear. Tools and methods need to be developed quickly in consultation with the key clients. Four concrete activities were suggested:

33.1 To establish a forum for discussion of governance programming among practitioners. IDRC was suggested as an appropriate founder of such a forum.

33.2 To create a forum which draws on the perspectives of recipients of governance assistance. This could be considered by Programs Branch at IDRC.

33.3 To build links with IDRC and its partners' work in the area of peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) was also recommended.

33.4 An inventory of relevant literature and studies would be a useful source of lessons learned for practitioners and evaluators in this field.

Annex 1

Evaluating Governance Programs
8 April 1999

Opening Remarks
Dean Stephen Toope

Introduction

I would like to thanks the President for organizing this workshop and for inviting me to make some initial comments.

This morning I will open the session by reviewing five main points which are central to the workshop:

- What is governance?
- Does evaluation in governance programming matter?
- What are the criteria for evaluation?
- What are there preconditions for effectiveness?
- Who benefits from, and who participates in, evaluation?

What is governance?

Is governance the flavour of the month in development circles? Yes, it is partly a fad in development – more and more work is defined in terms of governance. But is also reflects a reality that sound development probably is not possible, and certainly is not sustainable, without good governance. The case of the Asian Tigers, especially Thailand, illustrates this point well.

Is it important how we define governance? The definition matters because it ensures commonality of theme and clarity in our work. It also conditions appropriate criteria for evaluation. We are starting with the IOG (Institute on Governance) definition of governance:

> ***Governance comprises the institutions, processes and traditions which determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say.***

This definition gives us a good starting point. However, three points remain unanswered:

1. If it is true that you cannot evaluate overall governance (i.e., Has our initiative improved the governance of South Africa?) it may also be true that it is difficult to evaluate components of the overall governance framework. This is related to the issue of assessing – or even positing – causality, an issue to which I will return later.

2. What sectors are involved in governance? Are we interested in governance only with the public sector? How do organs of civil society – and even private sector actors – affect our evaluation of good governance? Consider, for example, the case of anti-corruption initiatives. Corruption is ingrained in the private sector in some countries (such as Korea). And we cannot institute effective anti-corruption measures in the public sector if we do not address the issue with the private sector as well.

3. What does it mean to say that governance is a "cross cutting theme"? The two main points would appear to be that it is relevant to all sectors; and that it should form part of all efforts at evaluation, not only for "governance programs".

Does evaluation in governance programming matter?

I am inclined to agree with the CIDA results-based management framework on this point, where it is argued that the more appropriate concept is "monitoring", not evaluation. This is only partly a semantic issue – participatory evaluation is related closely to the idea of monitoring, which is about learning lessons during a project and adjusting accordingly.

The issue of the relationship between monitoring and evaluation is addressed in the literature review prepared by Dr Kapoor with its emphasis on participatory evaluation in governance programming. This approach cuts across both monitoring and evaluation. In order to answer the question about the relevance of evaluation, we have to ask ourselves the central question for the workshop: What are the goals of the evaluation of governance programming?

Historically, evaluation has been a technocratic activity focussed on developing a more effective and efficient management system. As such, it is based on rationalist assumptions. And if we base our work on rationalist assumptions, then we need to establish causality. But the world doesn't work that way and there is an ongoing struggle with issues of causality in the social sciences.

Evaluation is also defined around different levels of effects of an activity. We can focus at the level of outputs, such as in the New Zealand model. Or we can focus on outcomes and results, or even at the level of the impacts of our activities. Professor Sutherland, in her report on the Program on Governance in South Africa, cautions against evaluation of results and impact.

A rationalist, scientific model is committed to an assessment of causality (intervention A leads to result B). Professor Sutherland correctly asks whether there is any reality to this approach if we recognize that social science cannot posit any laws of social behaviour, much less identify precise social causation.

This leaves us with a combination of data assessment and narrative. Inevitably these approaches are value-loaded: we can ask whether a project "promotes" human rights, or "fosters" citizen participation. This, of course, highlights the key issue of the role of "Canadian" values in our assessment.

The weakest, or least judgmental, form of evaluation is the stakeholder assessment of change, which is fully participatory. It is said to foster mutual learning and empowerment. These are admirable goals – but how real is this approach given the reality of continuing power imbalances notably in funder-recipient relationships? Are funders willing to accept purely "formative" evaluation, or is there a judgment day? Are we going to say in the end, "This is all well and good Mr Mbeki, but IDRC and CIDA are accountable to the Canadian taxpayer."

Establishing criteria for evaluation

A wide range of criteria for evaluating governance programs are posited by various authors and organizations. All of these different sets of criteria are affected by underlying assumptions about what governance is and who and what is being measured.

The OECD defines its evaluation of governance programs in terms of:

- **Improved decision-making;**
- **Improved resource allocation;** and
- **Improved accountability.**

The OECD Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance, as well as Dr Kapoor, add the notion of:

- **Transparency**; and

Dr Kapoor also adds the notion of:

- **Efficiency.**

Both Treasury Board and Professor Sutherland add:

- **Relevance to actual need;** and
- **Appropriate method/cost effect.**

And CIDA and Professor Sutherland add the notions of:

- **Sustainability;**
- **Partnership approach;**
- **Creativity or innovation;** and
- **Leveraging other commitments.**

Interestingly, there is very little talk thus far about other possible measures, such as:

- **Effectiveness**
- **Democratic participation.**

What we are left with from this survey of evaluation criteria is that there is neither coherence nor agreement on appropriate criteria for the evaluation of governance programming. Perhaps Professor Sutherland is correct in saying that you have to choose criteria specific to each case. The problem with this approach is that evaluator then wields enormous influence far beyond what s/he should wield in programming decisions. This approach also further undercuts any claim to a "scientific" approach to evaluation in this field. Our theory is embedded in our assumptions.

Preconditions for effectiveness (or at least outputs)

To evaluate governance programs, we need to look at their outputs. An important aspect of this is to understand the preconditions for achieving these outputs. Professor Kapoor notes that a central precondition for achieving outputs is realistic goal setting and clarity in those goals: in other words, we should not posit enormous effects from modest initiatives. I would like to propose the following additional criteria:

- Ownership and commitment (i.e., the demand for change) are central.
- There has to be political commitment to change.
- There has to be a realistic commitment of resources matched against objectives.
- There has to be a realistic and appropriate time commitment.
- Is there anything special which Canada has to offer? (For example, on of the South Africans interviewed by Professor Sutherland noted that there was too much emphasis on Canadian federalism vs. Indian, or other developing world, models of federalism.)

Who benefits from and who participates in evaluation?

To date, we have not been very clear on what we mean by partnership. We mix all kinds of it together in definition and assessment. Is it everyone with whom you work? Is it everyone you fund? What is the difference between a partner and a "stakeholder"? Many different people and groups are stakeholders (a term I don't like), but they have very different interests and needs, and certainly not all of them are partners. Or is partnership only those individuals and groups that have developed shared objectives and some mutuality of learning? This takes us back to the discussion of partnership led by CCIC (Canadian Council for International Cooperation) of roughly seven years ago.

Other questions we should be clear about include:

- In governance, is government inevitably the key partner?
- Will the appropriate partner depend in part on the CEA (Canadian Executing Agency)?
    - Can you change a government structure through non-governmental linkages?
    - Can a Canadian government organization partner with NGOs?
    - And what then is the impact on their government-to-government relations?

Conclusion: will we learn from evaluation of governance programs?

Answering the questions posed in my remarks might not be possible through evaluation. But evaluation can give us insights on process issues in implementing successful governance projects. Evaluation might also be able to give us some vague guiding principles. But it almost certainly cannot give us the norms against which to shape or justify future practice.

Annex 2

Evaluating Governance Programs
8 April 1999

Opening Remarks
Dr Al W. Johnson

A. Introduction

1. I would like to thank the President for arranging this workshop. It is timely if for no other reason than that governance programs seemingly are becoming the flavour of the month. And given this proliferation, it is time the international assistance community paused to reflect on where and what and how governance programmes should be initiated and conducted.

2. I am pleased, too, that the South Africa/Canada Program on Governance (PoG) has been chosen as the prime program to lead these reflections. There is, of course, a particular reason for this: it is a known Canadian Program that has reported and reflected upon the shaping and delivery of a governance program. We pay tribute to Professor Sharon Sutherland for her singular – and highly professional – role in preparing that report.

3. So, we have before us the benefit of the story of the PoG in South Africa, and the benefit of an assessment of that Program by a large number of South African DMs, ADMs and Directors General (to use the Canadian vocabulary) who have worked with the PoG. In addition, we have the judgment of half a dozen leading Canadian public service practitioners who assisted the Program from time to time.
4. Now, in this seminar, it is the turn of the deliverers of this and selected other governance programs, along with others who are responsible for international work where governance is an important element, to consider what can be learned from the experience to date of the South Africa/Canada Program on Governance. This review will be done, I hope, in the context of the larger questions of where, and what, and how governance programmes should be mounted.
5. In my remarks, first what I won't do:
   - I won't talk about the history or the content of the PoGs work – you have that in front of you.
   - Nor will I seek to assess the contribution the PoG has made, and what we can learn from it: that will becoming later this afternoon

I will do four things:

- Speak briefly to the character and attributes of the program and how they affect the functioning of the PoG;
- Identify and speak to the six principles upon which the PoG has been based – these are related to the character of the programmes
- Then I will turn to the methodology the Program developed and employed in its many projects. More precisely, I will identify and speak to the "instruments" we selected for making available Canadian experience;
- Finally I will give one example of how these instruments were used in a particular project, what they contributed and how they were ordered to achieve optimum results over time.

B. The Character of the South African /Canada Program on Governance.

I begin with a few words on the essential character of the South Africa / Canada Program on Governance.

1. First and foremost it is a **program based upon influence**, as can be seen from its objective – as I personally would put it :

   To assist an emerging democracy, led largely by people who had little or no experience in democratic governance, to develop institutions, public officials, and processes of government that will lead to effective policy making, and to the effective delivery of services within a democratic system. And to provide that assistance with the concurrence – indeed at the invitation of – the government agencies concerned.

   This assistance is not provided as part of a larger scheme, such as the governance programs of the OECD and the European Union (EU), designed as they are *inter alia,* to qualify or to certify applicants nations for membership in the EU – in respect of their governance capacities. There are, in short, no external incentives, or "conditions" which lend muscle to the advice Canadians may impart to South African officials. The Canadian advice, or references to the Canadian experience, must be persuasive because it is inherently sound, inherently beneficial, and because the Canadian officials come to inspire the confidence, and earn the trust of the South Africans, in the soundness of their experience, and their insights. And the Canadian practitioners must understand the South African culture of governance if they are to tailor their experience to South African needs.

   This is the essence of influence: a person's reputation for his/her knowledge, experience and insights, and his or her track record as a practitioner, is such that others are open to, indeed welcome, his/her advice, and are likely to respond to it.

Clearly, given the character of the PoG, the choice of Canadian practitioners is vital.

2. The second characteristic of PoG is the size of the program, and the obvious need to position itself and its work in relation to the vast panoply of institutions and systems of government where assistance might be useful. There is also the need to determine the level at which PoG can most usefully contribute to the issues and problems confronting South Africa's government.

   On which crucial elements of government do you focus? The answer to that question depends on which South African agencies and senior officials seek out assistance from PoG; and it further depends on the capacities of the PoG people on the ground, or likely to be available to the Program, e.g., from the provinces.

   Well, you know of the roles we came to play: you have seen them in the report. Put briefly they include:

   - Work on the functioning of the federal/multi-sphere system of government
     - the initial work on constitutional discussions
     - working with the FFC from the beginning
     - intergovernmental relations

   - Parliament and the legislatures: after some familiarization sessions for the legislative assemblies early on we focussed upon one leading-edge project: namely public participation in Guateng

   - Work in five provinces through the vehicle of twinning arrangements between Canadian and South African provinces – focussing on the Premier's Office and the Cabinet Office, and on Central agencies generally.

   - Work with one national department – DPW

   - Work on one of the important systems or process of government – specifically planning and budgeting

   - Work with Public services
     - PSC
     - DPSA
     - Prov. Public services (twinned provinces)

   - Even membership in a national Royal Commission on the institutions and processes of Government – an instructive effort!!

C. The Principles upon which the Program has been based

We have identified six principles by which we are guided in managing the PoG. You will see, as I go through them, that all are designed not only to make available and assure to South Africa the best and most experienced Canadian practitioners, but also to focus our efforts on key areas of government (as I have described them) using the most effective instruments for "transferring the knowledge and experience of real life practitioners".

1. Practitioner-to-Practitioner Approach

Principle:

The Program is founded upon practitioner-to practitioner exchanges.

It seems clear to us that the most effective diagnosis of issues and problems – and the positing of alternative approaches to them – emerges from a comparison of experiences – even though the Canadian experience may be much more mature than the South African experience. By practitioners, I mean both the PoG practitioners on the ground and Canadian provincial officials working under the twinning arrangements.

It is a matter of recognizing that "preaching and teaching" are not on. South African senior practitioners have their own unique experience in aspects of public life, and in trying to transform the public service of their country. Canadians need to know this and to factor it into the exposition of how we – in mature governments – do things. This is not an academic exercise.

This principle is based on the recognition that practitioners speak the same language – or are quick to do so. Bonds of "kinship" that emerge from this "club" are a very necessary part of South Africans coming to seek out and to benefit from Canadian experience.

2. Presence of PoG in South Africa

Principle

The Program depends upon, indeed demands, a continuing presence in South Africa.

I mean two kinds of presence. The first kind is having senior Canadian practitioners on the ground in South Africa, people who are there continuously, over extended periods of time. This results in learning much more about South African issues and problems, and the institutions and processes where these issues arise. More, it is in this way that Canadians come to be recognized for their capacity – and are used. The continuing Canadian presence is manifested, too, in a different way, by the twinning arrangements between provinces. Even here, however, the continuity and the effectiveness of province-to-province exchanges are buttressed by PoG's presence on the ground.

The second kind of presence is the "presence of the persons", engaged by PoG. Given

the level at which they are expected to operate, they must by their person and by their stature, born in no small measure of their experience, command the respect of senior South African public servants.

3. Accessibility of Canadian Practitioners

Principle

"Accessibility" to Canadian practitioners and their experience, without artificial impediments to engaging the assistance of the PoG.

Of course there are boundaries to any aid project, but a good governance program must be free to interpret its own boundaries, and to respond as things change. Otherwise the program becomes halting and hesitating in a manner that stultifies relationships from the South Africans' point of view.

That is one of the reasons for engaging experienced DMs; and ADMs and DGs in governance programs: they can be trusted to exercise the same judgment and discretion that they have learned and exercised as top public servants in Canada.

4. Key People/Key Places/Key Processes

Principle

The focus of the Program should be Key People/Key Places/Key Processes in the Government of South Africa.

Manifestly Canada's influence will be greater if our projects have this focus.

One must try to get the big picture right, in governance:

- Key People must be supported in getting things right.
- Key Places must be properly identified and organized and properly staffed to get things right.
- Key Processes – like constitution building and planning and budgeting and intergovernmental relations – must get it right.

Otherwise the effectiveness of everything else – of smaller, less obvious aspects of governance will suffer.

Having said all this, giving donor assistance in these areas – being invited into them – is tricky and difficult. And on the other side, doing good work in smaller, less obvious aspects of governance is not to be dismissed.

There is one major caveat: if the big picture of governance in any country is seriously deficient, whether by reason of incompetence, or corruption, or the violation of democratic constitutions or institutions, one is forced to go back to the fundamental questions I posed at the beginning: where and what and how governance programs

should be initiated.

5. Responsiveness and Evolution

Principle

Any program on governance must be responsive to emerging issues, changing needs, shifts in the political agenda.

The landscape is continuously shifting and the Program has to be flexible enough to respond to those changes.

6. Character and Direction of the Program

Principle

Mentoring is an important element in developing the capacity for provincial level management.

Mentoring is especially important given the "on the job" nature of PoG and indeed of governance in South Africa.

D. Methodology: the seven principal instruments for delivering the PoG in South Africa

1. Networking by PoG's Special Advisors in South Africa

- Developing / maintaining / broadening wide networks of contacts in South Africa and within Canada
  - a great many of them being senior public servants who have been involved in PoG projects;
  - officials who have become friends, and with whom wider discussions about South African political and governmental affairs have become possible;
  - simply knowledgeable friends or associates – from NGOs, universities, people engaged in other aid projects; and
  - officials in Embassies and High Commissions.

- I won't say more about networking: I am intimidated by the presence of one of Canada's greatest networkers – IDRC's Maureen O'Neil.

2. Study visits to Canada

- Are an important part of most of our projects – but are most prevalent as a part of the province-to-province twinning arrangements;

- There are short initial visits to familiarize South Africans with a particular aspect of government (the target of a possible project, for example);

- Short visits are important, too, for the discussion of concepts underlying the

functioning of target areas of governance work;

- Still longer visits are several weeks to a couple of months, say, involving skills, transfer and mentoring.

3. Diagnostic and assessment visits of Canadians to South Africa
   - To familiarize the Canadian officials with the problems South African officials are confronting in the target areas of a project – or potential project.
   - Diagnostic and assessment visits to recommend changes in processes or structures of government and management of these structures.

4. Workshops
   - Are an important tool for all the major projects – comparative constitutions earlier on; fiscal arrangements; planning and budgeting; intergovernmental relations; the central agencies of government – frequently as the starting point for a major project.
   - Bring together top Canadian practitioners with top South Africans to discuss Canadian experience in an area where South Africans are experiencing problems and which they can discuss together.
   - Are an effective vehicle for identifying and discussing central issues in the selected area of government and for the Canadians to discuss what works and what does not work in Canada.
   - Workshops, particularly when held in Canada, and of course privately, seem to evoke the frankest and most penetrating discussions among South Africans themselves, of the problems and the issues bothering them – attesting to the trust that has developed between the South Africans and the Canadians involved.

5. Presence in South Africa of Special Advisors in PoG
   - These advisors are available as consultants on an intermittent or continuing basis, on such subjects as Cabinet Offices, Central Agencies, Planning and Budgeting, Intergovernmental Relations.

6. Long duration assignment of Canadians to South Africa
   - This is a part of the PoG's high priority projects such as planning and budgeting – having specific objectives and planned outputs.
   - These assignments involve skills transfers, systems design, and general mentoring.

7. Participating in a South African Royal Commission on the functions, structures and processes of the national and provincial governments

- AW Johnson was a member of the Presidential Review Commission – one of three foreigners in a Commission of 16.

- The intention was to have foreigners on the Commission to bring their expertise to Commission studies and deliberations and to participate as full members of the Commission (UK, Canada, Sweden).

- In fact, both the design of the Commission's work program, and the formulation of recommendations was the work of the South Africans – despite the fact, for example, that Al W Johnson was chosen as the Supervising Commissioner in respect of planning and budgeting. The same was the case for other Supervising Commissioners, black or white. In the end, this had to be so: the Commission was a South African Commission.

- The other side of the coin is that PoG did contribute materially to the recommendations on planning and budgeting, taking the form of a Report from a Working Committee - the work of which was done largely by PoG. That work and report also contributed significantly to PoG's project on planning and budgeting.

E. An example of how these instruments combine and complement one another in major projects.

1. The example:
   The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) that recommends the allocation of RSA revenues between the national, the provincial and local governments.

2. We sought an invitation to appear before the FFC at its first meeting in 1994 and told them how Canada's fiscal arrangements might be helpful to them (Instrument # 5 - the presence in South Africa of PoG's Special Advisors).

3. AW Johnson was invited as one of 6 or 7 foreign experts to attend a conference to do an assessment of the FFC's first draft formulae for allocating revenues (Again, Instrument # 5).

4. Throughout the whole period – from 1994 on to 1999, PoG's Special Advisors met with individual members of the Commission and its Chief Executive Officer, and with (mostly) provincial people about the system and the methods for dividing revenues (Instrument # 1, Networking).

5. PoG organized a week-long workshop in Canada on intergovernmental fiscal

arrangements. Top Canadians participated (Instrument # 4, Workshop).

6. PoG brought together Canada's Chief Statistician (plus some colleagues), and the Chair and CEO of the FFC to discuss and examine the use of proxy measures of fiscal need, part of the South African fiscal arrangements (Instrument # 2, Study visits to Canada).

7. Chair of FFC and AW Johnson attended South African workshops on Intergovernmental Relations (Instrument # 5, Resident PoG advisors).

8. FFC then requested the long term (1 year) assignment of one of Canada's experts on fiscal arrangements to work full time with FFC staff (Instruments # 6, Long duration assignment of Canadians to South Africa).

9. This is a work in Progress and doubtless additional instruments will be used over the rest of this process.

In summary, this presents the character of the PoG, the principles on which it is based, the instruments it employs and finally an illustration of work in one of its projects, with the FFC.

Annex 3

Evaluating Governance Programs
8 April 1999

Background Paper and Literature Review

by
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for the
Evaluation Unit
International Development Research Centre
March 1999

Background Paper for the Workshop on Evaluating Governance Programs
Ottawa, April 8, 1999

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1. Introduction: Defining and Framing the Issue

The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) to undertake a survey of the current literature on evaluating governance programmes (Sections 2 & 3 of the paper); and (ii) to provide a brief assessment (constraints, implications) of the main governance evaluation approaches and instruments (Section 4). But before we proceed to realizing this twofold purpose, it is important to define what is meant by "evaluating governance programmes", for this, in turn, will help us fix the scope of the task before us.

All definitions, and the practices implied by them, are contestable and debatable. In the case of "evaluation", the debate in the literature arises not so much over its meaning as over its practice (i.e. what methodology/approach is to be used in evaluation). The next section of this paper is devoted precisely to elucidating this debate. For our immediate purpose though, "evaluation" can be defined as an assessment of policies, organizations or programmes aimed at improving decision-making, resource allocation and accountability (OECD 1999:6).

The definitional issue is not quite so straightforward when it comes to "governance". The differences and debate among international development agencies[1] tend to hinge on two factors. First, there is the question of whether to include in the definition of governance the influences, needs, resources and competencies of both state and civil society. During the 1980s decade of "structural adjustment", the tendency (especially of the World Bank and IMF) was to exclude civil society; now most international agencies, including the World Bank, invest it with great importance. Second, there is the question of the breadth of the definition, that is, whether governance involves decision-making in some or all of the multiple "sectors" of development (socio-economic, institutional, cultural and environmental sectors). The World Bank and OECD, for example, tend to take a more restrictive view (emphasizing decision-making as it applies to the first two sectors); the UNDP and CIDA tend to take a broader view (emphasizing decision-making as it applies to all sectors) (Johnson/CIDA 1997; WB 1992, 1994; UNDP 1997; Kapoor/CIDA 1998)[2]. One of the most comprehensive definitions, and one we can use as a working definition for this paper, is provided by the Institute on Governance: "Governance comprises the institutions, processes and traditions which determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say" (Johnson 1997: 3; see also Miller 1996). This definition implies that governance is not a distinct sector of development; it intersects all sectors, and as such constitutes a cross-cutting theme (Kapoor & Williams/CIDA 1999). Governance, moreover, is seen as involving both public sector institutions and citizen groups.

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[1] For a useful comparative analysis of the definition and components of "governance" among donors, see Johnson/CIDA 1997.

[2] The following short forms will be used for the references within the text: WB=World Bank; EDI=Economic Development Institute (of the World Bank), HRCA=Human Rights Council of Australia, Comonwealth=Commonwealth Secretariat, DAC=Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD).

The various definitions and conceptions of governance just mentioned entail a number of governance activities or components. In fact, the recent tendency of many development agencies is to include an increasingly wide range of components under "governance". For instance, the UNDP and DAC add human rights to their list of governance activities, arguing for the need to mainstream human rights in all development activities (UNDP 1997; DAC 1997; see also HRCA 1995). A survey of what some of the main international development organizations include in governance thus yields the following list: public sector management (administrative and financial reform, privatization, civil service reform), the rule of law, anti-corruption strategies, decentralization, the reduction of military expenditures, participation (by citizens, civil society organizations, media, private sector), and human rights (Johnson/CIDA 1997; Kapoor/CIDA 1998).

This long list of governance activities would considerably expand and complicate our task of surveying and assessing governance evaluation were it not for two restraining factors. On the one hand, the field of governance evaluation is relatively new, with most international development agencies and governments having limited experience to date. For instance, the review of the literature reveals that, within the international development community, only the OECD/DAC and World Bank/EDI have begun to examine the field in a systematic way (and here, too, mainly in the evaluation of public sector management). Most other agencies, as well as governments, have evaluation experience and knowledge in a small number of discrete governance-related activities such as capacity development in the civil service, performance measurement in human rights programming, or service delivery mechanisms. A similar picture emerges from the survey of academic literature: while there is much available on general evaluation methodologies and approaches, there is practically nothing on their application to governance. Consequently, the task of surveying and assessing governance evaluation in this paper must of necessity be tentative and incomplete.

On the other hand, we are concerned here primarily with the evaluation of governance programmes supported by international development organizations such as IDRC and CIDA. This programming is necessarily limited (in size and scope), entailing that evaluations have to focus, not on a country's overall governance, but on discrete activities within a country's overall governance. As a result, the task of evaluating governance does not mean evaluating all governance activities at once and comprehensively. Rather, given our purposes here and based on the survey of current literature, this paper will take our task to mean two things: (i) examine generic approaches/methodologies to evaluation that can be (and are) applied to a range of discrete governance programmes ("Evaluation <u>of</u> Governance Programming" covered in Section 2); and (ii) examine ways of providing discrete support to evaluation <u>within</u> governance: for example, by establishing an Auditor General's Office to make the public sector's accounting practices more transparent, or establishing public sector service delivery surveys to improve government services ("Programming Evaluation <u>In</u> Governance", covered in Section 3).

2. Evaluation Of Governance Programming: Generic Approaches and Instruments

(i) From "Blueprint" to Participatory Approaches to Evaluation

There appears to be a noticeable movement in the literature away from what may be called a "blueprint" towards a "participatory" approach to the theory and practice of evaluation. During the 1960s and 1970s, evaluation, like the development programming to which it was tied, relied primarily on the social science paradigm of its time (Marsden et. al. 1994). Taking its cue from the natural sciences, this paradigm argued for a universal, objective reality that could be broken down into separate component parts by a "neutral" observer, and then analysed and acted upon (Uphoff 1992). The role accorded to evaluation, in this scheme of things, was to find and assess conclusive and objective evidence of change through clear cause and effect relationships.

In the hands of governments and the international development community, the above approach to evaluation took on a "technocratic" and "managerial" approach (Guba & Lincoln 1989: 35ff.; Marsden et. al.1994: 96ff.). This translated into the need for evaluation to justify public spending through cost-benefit analysis, to have short-term horizons dictated by fiscal calendars, and to rely heavily on measurable (i.e. quantitative) data. It also meant that, frequently, evaluations were indistinguishable from "audits", aimed at ensuring not only financial regularity but also that rules, regulations and mandates were being followed (Guilmette 1998). Finally, it meant that evaluations could be conducted by "expert" evaluators, who because of their informed objectivity, could be external and "independent" to the programme or institution being evaluated.

Gradually, this view of evaluation came under criticism. Of particular concern was its tendency to impose "outside" and sometimes irrelevant assessment criteria on programmes under the guise of "objectivity". This top-down, "blueprint" approach lent itself to little or no accommodation of the diversity and specificity of local values and stakeholders (Guba & Lincoln 1989; Marsden et. al. 1994). From a developing country perspective, the approach came under notably harsh reproach: it was seen as yet another form of Western domination.

Partly in response to this criticism, partly inspired by the work of such critical theorists as Paulo Freire (1970), the 1980s saw the rise of a new, mainly NGO-led approach to the delivery and evaluation of development programming (Chambers 1994a, 1994b, 1994c). Reality, under this approach, is seen not as universal and objective, but as socially-constructed and ever-changing. "Truth", "fact" and "cause-effect" are portrayed as complex and multi-layered, and can only be apprehended subjectively (or inter-subjectively). As a result, the role of evaluation (developed through "Rapid Rural Appraisal" and "Participatory Rural Appraisal" techniques) is to understand and assess change by including the perspectives of all stakeholders. Rather than programme managers and outside evaluators unilaterally extracting and categorizing information, all programme stakeholders are empowered to engage in defining evaluation procedures and

methods through a process of dialogue and group learning. The role of the outside evaluator is to act as "catalyst" or "facilitator" of this process.

Evaluation, in the hand of the participatory approach, is not meant to provide objective or definitive answers, but to assess results through dynamic, negotiated consensus. The way in which the evaluation is conducted is crucial, so that the exercise is as much a results-assessment process as it is a learning and empowering process for all stakeholders. The participatory approach is not unconcerned with the issues prioritized by the "blueprint" approach – internal rules and procedures, and the efficiency and effectiveness of outputs. What is new is making the evaluation process self-reflexive: questions of "why", "how" and "for whom"/"by whom" the evaluation is being done are integral to the evaluation, not decided outside or prior to it (ODA 1994:5).

(ii) **A Participatory Approach to Governance Evaluation**

As pointed out earlier, much of the literature surveyed for this paper recognizes (implicitly or explicitly) that the participatory approach to evaluation is still relatively new, and hence its application to governance is newer still. But while the practice of participatory governance evaluation is still in its formative years, the international development community appears to have adopted, or to be adopting, many of its theoretical and methodological underpinnings.

An important feature of a participatory approach is that, because it focuses on the process of evaluation, its methodology is easily adaptable to programming across the various components of governance. The following is a summary of what are seen to be the main features and strengths of a participatory approach to evaluating a range of governance activities[3]:

(a) *Participation expands the project/programme information base for governance evaluation.* Identifying, defining and measuring results hinges on comprehensive information collection. Bringing together all project/programme stakeholders[4] can help ensure that:

- a full and wide variety of information and knowledge held by stakeholders is identified, coordinated/linked;
- information on, and interests of, a diverse range of social groups, including disadvantaged or marginalized social groups (women, children, disabled people, aboriginal peoples, religious/cultural minorities, etc.), are integrated;
- quantitative information is complemented by qualitative information and descriptive

[3] This summary is based on the following sources: OECD 1999; DAC 1993, 1997; WB 1994, 1995, 1996; Roper/Oxfam 1998; Chambers 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; GTZ 1991; UNDP 1996; HRCA 1995; ODA 1994; Stolz & Lanting 1991; Zarzueta/WRI 1995; Armstrong/IDRC 1998; Brown/CIDA 1995; Kapoor/CIDA 1996, 1997.

[4] Stakeholders usually include some or all of the following: the external funders, the programme managers, the programme executing agency, the programme beneficiaries/organizational staff/clients, and any other group/organization/donor that may be indirectly affected or concerned by the programme.

statements, based on stakeholders' perceptions and judgements; the use of stakeholders'/clients' subjective assessment of change before, through and after the programme can help do away with the need to commission "baseline studies"; and

- local knowledge and creativity, including "home grown" cultural and sociol-political practices and institutions, are incorporated.

(b) *Participation clarifies and stabilises channels of communication and power dynamics for governance evaluations*. The inclusion of all relevant actors in the programme management and evaluation process means that the full range of stakeholders' needs, values and interests can be identified and discussed. Dialogue between stakeholders helps iron out, or at least acknowledge, differences and disagreements. This makes channels of communication more transparent and controlled, and minimises uncertainty, mystification, miscommunication and misinterpretation of evaluation criteria, contents, purposes and results.

(c) *Participation creates an iterative environment for decision-making on performance*. Increasingly complex and uncertain programme environments mean that programme objectives and resource allocation needs are seldom always clear. However,

- especially in the case of mid-programme evaluations, as information and knowledge change, management/stakeholders can make decisions and allocate or re-allocate resources when and where necessary to ensure project sustainability and achieve better results;
- better information means that management/stakeholders can better assess risks, or re-formulate programme objectives in light of new risks; and
- an iterative environment ensures the sound selection and purpose of evaluation criteria and indicators by allowing stakeholders to collectively tailor assessment information to their particular needs and interests; as a result of such an integration into programming, the usefulness and impact of evaluations is heightened (much of the literature points out that the lack of this integration is what explains the lack of usefulness and impact of evaluations in the past);

(d) *Participation builds ownership, commitment and accountability*:

- if project managers and stakeholders are not included in the design and identification of results, they cannot be expected to feel responsible, or be held responsible, for project performance; if they are included, they tend to "buy into" the project and feel empowered and accountable to reaching project objectives; these actions, in turn, help spurn team-building, joint-problem-solving and local (developing country) management capacity; and
- open communication helps clarify roles and responsibilities among all stakeholders before, during and after an evaluation; and consensus- building means that all stakeholders, not just some (funders, managers or executing agencies) share accountability; this, in turn, helps all stakeholders to avoid being

overly conservative and risk-averse for fear of having to bear all risks and accountability.

(iii) **Participatory Governance Evaluation Instruments**

Based on the survey of the literature, none of the agencies using a participatory approach to governance programming and evaluation seem to have developed instruments for this purpose in any systematic way. The following are three distinct (although not mutually-exclusive) instruments that are identified as relevant or useful to governance evaluation. Each adheres, in some way or another, to the approach and dimensions of participatory evaluation listed in the last two sections.

(a) *Participatory governance evaluations*[5]

Participatory governance evaluations follow the same modalities as generic participatory evaluations. The idea is to involve all stakeholders in the design, development and implementation of the evaluation. These evaluations can be carried out either mid-stream (formative evaluation) or at the end of a project (summative evaluation). They can be applied to a range of activities – governance-related training, capacity building, or policy-making. The evaluator(s) is usually external to the programme or institution being evaluated. But the evaluator(s) can also be specialized staff of a partner organization with which the governance programme or institution has been twinned. Institutional twinning arrangements and partnerships underscore the iterative dimension of participatory evaluations, making them a truly collaborative process through which both organizations learn and evaluate one another.

The evaluator's role is to facilitate and coordinate the evaluation process. This role can be more or less pro-active, depending on the purpose of the evaluation: if the purpose is to help improve transparency and accountability within the organization/programme or provide new/technical/specialized perspectives, the evaluator takes on a more interventionist role (but still with the consensus of all stakeholders); if the purpose is to increase organizational learning or improve implementation and resource allocation, the evaluator takes on a less interventionist role, involving stakeholders to a greater extent.

The most common technique used here is the "stakeholder evaluation workshop". This brings together all relevant stakeholders (or stakeholder representatives or focus groups) for 2-3 day sessions, in which participants collectively design the evaluation (establish the rules of the game and the working relationships) and/or assess the programme using both quantitative and qualitative information. "Stakeholder analyses" can help identify appropriate stakeholders for the workshops. Two other techniques that can be used, usually to complement the evaluation

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[5] This subsection is based mainly on the following sources: Roper/Oxfam 1998; Chambers 1994b; WB 1996, 1995; OECD 1999, 1997: 90ff.; GTZ 1991; Salmen 1992; Armstrong/IDRC 1998.

workshop, include: "beneficiary assessments", undertaken to carry out a systematic investigation of particular stakeholders (women, minorities, policy managers, etc.) to ensure their concerns and assessments are heard and incorporated into the evaluation; and "systematic client consultations", which survey programme clients and incorporate their feedback into programming and evaluation.

(b) *Self-Assessments*[6]

Rather than resorting to evaluations conducted by external evaluators, governance organizations and programme stakeholders can assess themselves. Here, the organization and stakeholders become full participants, and by emphasizing local knowledge and empowerment, the evaluation is completely decentralized. Self-assessment teams within the organization/programme are usually formed to guide the process both strategically and operationally.

To facilitate self-assessments, external funders can provide training to relevant stakeholders and/or develop manuals/"toolboxes" (see Lusthaus et.al./IDRC 1999). During the actual assessment, external funders can take part as observers in the assessment process, or can remain out of the process completely, relying on the results of the self-assessments once they are completed.

Self-assessments can be used for a number of reasons: to understand and improve performance (efficiency and effectiveness of programme delivery, finance, staffing, etc.), to carry out strategic planning, or to evaluate organizational strengths and weaknesses. They can be full-scale assessments (for strategic planning), but lend themselves well to conducting smaller, issue-based evaluations (staff training, gender equity, budgeting, service delivery, etc.).

(c) *Participatory Development of Governance Performance Indicators*[7]

Performance indicators monitor a programme's performance against expected results. They can, and are, used in evaluations such as those described in (a) and (c) above. However, here, they are integrated into governance programming from the start. The participatory development of governance performance indicators involves all programme stakeholders in the design, development and monitoring of expected results throughout the programme (i.e. from inception to implementation to close of the programme). Thus, planning, decision-making, implementation and evaluation are all linked.

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[6] This sub-section is a survey of issues raised in the following main sources: Lusthaus et.al./IDRC 1999, 1995; Chambers 1994b; Commonwealth 1996; Roper/Oxfam 1998; Dia/WB 1993; WB 1994, 1995.

[7] This sub-section is a survey of issues raised in the following main sources: CIDA 1996a, 1996b; Brown/CIDA 1995; Kapoor/CIDA 1997a, 1997b, 1998; Lusthaus et.al./IDRC 1998; IDRC 1996, 1997; USAID 1998, DAC 1995; Hood/EDI 1995; Cummings 1997.

Using this instrument means that indicators are continuously integrated into the project management process; they monitor change on a regular basis and at every stage of programme development. Participatory evaluations and self-assessments (a and b above), on the other hand, provide a "snapshot" assessment of the project, usually only after a time period has elapsed since the programme launch (ex-post). This is not to say, however, that (a) and (b) above and the participatory development of indicators are not complementary: data from a mid-term programme evaluation, for example, could be used for performance monitoring purposes, although such data would have only provisional validity. Similarly, as pointed out above, indicators can be deployed as measurement tools within participatory evaluations and self-assessments.

The main technique used to develop performance indicators is once again a stakeholder workshop of the type described in (a) above. The purpose of the workshop is to develop the programme objectives, activities and indicators (quantitative and qualitative) against which progress towards objectives will be monitored and measured. A useful planning tool sometimes used in this exercise (by CIDA, World Bank) is the logical framework (LF/LFA), an analytical planning tool that clarifies the logic and linkages through time between a programme's inputs (resources), outputs (immediate results), outcomes (short-term results and narrower effects of the programme) and impacts (longer-term results and broader effects). Stakeholders collaboratively develop performance indicators for each of the programme levels of the LFA, and monitor/assess results periodically throughout the programme cycle. Consequently, results are custom-designed by all stakeholders for each programme, indicators can be revised when necessary in a flexible manner, and stakeholders can learn from mistakes and successes.

3. Programming Evaluation in Governance: Some Recent Instruments

While the previous section examined approaches and instruments to evaluate governance programming, this section examines ways of programming evaluation within governance that are suggested in the literature. What is peculiar to this type of programming is that it is an attempt to make a country's governance structures and institutions self-evaluating. Governance institutions are provided with the capacity to monitor themselves, at least in some areas, or separate institutions are created to act as checks and balances to abuse of public resources and power. Thus, programming is used to address a range of governance evaluation issues -- from transparency (e.g. anti-corruption activities) to efficiency (e.g. establishment of an auditor general's office, civil service reform, service delivery mechanisms) to accountability (e.g. rule of law, ombudsman offices, civil society participation). From the point of view of international donors, all of these activities can be supported individually, with each discrete activity contributing in some measure to a country's capacity to evaluate its governance.

The range of activities below is far from comprehensive, that is, it does not cover all

possible ways of programming evaluation into governance[8]. Rather, it represents some of the current trends (not listed in order of priority) in the international development community. Where underlined in the literature, some of the weaknesses and constraints of each activity are pointed out. Several activities are inter-related, and many have cross-cutting themes such as institutional/capacity building.

(i) **Financial Instruments**[9]

A number of institutions can be established or strengthened to monitor the public sector's accounting/budgeting/expenditure management, performance and probity, but also to set wider performance, evaluation, efficiency and accountability standards and procedures. These institutions can range from various types of Auditor General's Offices (to carry out internal/external audits or financial/management audits) to Courts of Accounts (to promote government financial accountability). Key ingredients for the effectiveness of such institutions are the provision of financial self-sufficiency (security against political retaliation), political independence (protection from political interference) and legal authority (power to prosecute all offenders).

(ii) **Civil Servants' Performance Mechanisms**[10]

To increase the efficiency and creativity of civil servants, performance incentives and sanctions can be established. Here, rewards and penalties (for high/poor performance) are fulfilled through pay and career advances. The literature points out that, for this mechanisms to work well, rewards and penalties must be clearly linked to pay and promotion, and staff performance works best when tasks and quality expected are not imposed but mutually-agreed upon between manager and employee.

(iii) **Decentralization**[11]

Decentralization is meant to increase government accountability and responsiveness by changing the balance of power from central to local/regional authorities and by allowing for greater civil society/community participation in state planning and decision-making. It can take many forms: administrative "deconcentration" that shifts workloads from central to local authorities; transfer of responsibilities to local levels to implement sectoral programmes; transfer of political authority to local levels; and economic decentralization, giving local government greater autonomy over resource collection (taxation) and spending. While promising,

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[8] Although the current literature does not suggest it, deficit-cutting, public service downsizing and lay-offs, and privatization could conceivably also be added to the list of activities below, since, from an extreme "structural adjustment" perspective, they are (arguably) also ways of making governance more efficient.

[9] See Nunberg 1999; DAC 1993; Commonwealth 1996; Sheldon 1996.

[10] See Nunberg 1999; DAC 1997; Commonwealth 1996.

[11] See DAC 1997; Kapoor/CIDA 1995, 1998.

decentralization has, more often than not, been unsuccessful. Several reasons are given here: failure of the centre to delegate real power (economic or political); inadequate local capacity to plan, manage or deliver programmes; local government paralysis arising out of inter-community/ethnic/religious competition for scarce resources; and lack of clarity in defining local responsibilities.

(iv) **Service Delivery Mechanisms**[12]

Service delivery mechanisms are an increasingly popular instrument for decentralization. They are intended to do two things: (a) make public services (health, education, garbage collection, etc.) more efficient, competitive, qualitative and responsive by designing and delivering services around clients/users/citizens; and (b) decentralize government by giving local public service managers greater freedom to manage the delivery of services within the purview of government policy guidelines and resources. Once public services are decentralized, managers can use a number of techniques to make services competitive and user-friendly: the use of "client surveys" can help provide user feedback on whether local providers are effective, competitive, timely, accessible, etc.; and "benchmarking" can motivate local providers by comparing their performance to other similar providers or setting/monitoring standards of performance. The literature on service delivery surveyed for this paper points out that, like most decentralized mechanisms, a lingering problem is the lack of integration of local performance results and information into centralized planning, decision-making and resource allocation.

(v) **Anti-Corruption Measures**[13]

In recent years, the World Bank/EDI, in collaboration with Transparency International, have spearheaded programming in anti-corruption as a way of increasing accountability and transparency in governance. Unlike the traditional approach to this issue, which tended to take a top-down, moralizing approach that made corruption the sole responsibility of governments, the gist here is to tackle the issue on many fronts and to involve a range of actors, all of whom are seen as part of the problem and the solution:

> (a) in the public sector: clarify public sector rules and regulations covering recruitment/employment; modify incentive and performance structures (reform pay and promotion practices); establish administrative controls (clear administrative procedures covering procurement, transparent contracting rules and procedures, auditing offices); enact a code of ethics and legal provisions against corruption; create anti-corruption offices and ombudsmen; and improve procedures covering the embezzlement and fungibility of donor funds.

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[12] See Cowper & Samuels 1998; Dahlberg & Isaacson 1998; OECD 1996; DAC 1997; Armstrong/IDRC 1998; Treasury Board 1998a; Langseth/EDI 1995; Commonwealth 1996.

[13] See Kato et. al./EDI 1996; Transparency International 1996; Williams/USAID 1996; Kapoor/CIDA 1998.

(b) by civil society: strengthen civil society organizations to monitor the practices of not only the public sector, but the private sector and donors as well, and to demand that these activities be honest, efficient and transparent.

(c) through cooperation and dialogue between the public sector, private sector (domestic and foreign), civil society organizations and donors aimed at joint anti-corruption measures.

(vi) **The Rule of Law**[14]

The rule of law is the cornerstone of governance accountability. Programming in this area aims at building legal foundations (constitution, legislation) and legal institutions (legal capacity, law enforcement). The former includes strengthening civil law/common law traditions and establishing the full range of human rights protections, civil and political rights (including freedom of expression and association), and socio-economic rights (including gender rights). The latter ranges from upper/lower court systems, police forces, ombudsman offices (for human rights protection, anti-corruption activities, etc.), to constitutional and administrative courts (to protect fundamental rights, guarantee separation of powers, resolve conflicts among public sector organs and between the public administration and citizens, etc.).

(vii) **Public Participation**[15]

Increased public participation can contribute to governance accountability. The more participatory the public sector, the more politically legitimate and responsive it can become. Public participation can increase a country's capacity to govern by allowing the state to embrace the organizational talents and resources of civil society organizations (for better planning, service delivery, etc.). And civil society can act as a counterweight to the power of government, not only behaving as a negative check, but also helping to sustain political interest in governmental reform.

Public participation is not, of course, an easy feat to accomplish. It requires several important ingredients, not the least of which are political will, and the public sector knowledge, capacity and resources to manage and implement partnerships with civil society.

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[14] See DANIDA 1996; Nunberg 1999; DAC 1997.
[15] See DAC 1997; Plumptre 1992; Uphoff 1992; Kapoor/CIDA 1995.

4. Constraints and Implications of Governance Evaluation

There are several constraints and implications regarding the approaches to, and instruments of, governance evaluation and their adoption by development practitioners. Some of these constraints and implications are implicit in the above analysis and literature review, and hence this section will attempt to make them explicit; others are made explicit in the literature itself; others still, will remain unresolved and subject to further reflection and experience.

(i) The Transition from "Blueprint" to Participatory Approaches to Governance Evaluation

Just because there seems to be a transition within the international development community towards the adoption of participatory approaches to evaluation (or to governance evaluation) does not mean that this transition is smooth or complete. Several documents point out that, while some international development organizations have embraced participatory approaches, many (especially within the donor community) are only doing so in stages (DAC 1997: 28, 103; Brown 1995; Kapoor/CIDA 1996). For example, agencies might use PRA techniques in programmes, but they "typically fall short of bringing [stakeholders] fully into the evaluation process" (DAC ibid). Much more time and effort are needed, therefore, to better integrate ("mainstream") participatory approaches at all levels of policy-making and programming and to further develop tools and techniques for its application to governance evaluation (DAC 1997:25-6; Found 1997).

Why the reticence to use participatory approaches? Firstly, probably because, to put it colloquially, "old habits die hard": the transition requires nothing less than a change of organizational culture, involving less demands for control and "independence" of evaluations than before, less emphasis on using only quantitative data, etc. And secondly, probably because participatory techniques entail, at least at the outset of programmes, a heavier commitment of time and resources (human, institutional and financial) to ensure adequate stakeholder involvement. Although not easy, what might be a useful exercise is to carry out a cost-benefit analysis comparing traditional vs. participatory methods, although it would be important to be able to value (and this is what might be difficult to do) such qualitative participatory elements as "long-term sustainability", "empowerment", and "learning". Such an exercise might help sort out whether it is effective to adopt participatory approaches and techniques across the board, or whether "blueprint" approaches might be useful (expedient?) in some cases (perhaps in the case of small and short-term projects?).

(ii) Evaluating "Governance" or "Discrete Governance Programmes"?

As was pointed out at the outset of this paper, the peculiarity of governance programming from the point of view of international donors is that such programming is discrete and small relative to the size and complexity of the recipient country's governance structures and institutions. It becomes very difficult, therefore, to evaluate the impact of individual projects on

"governance" as a whole (Sutherland 1998: 7, 9, 17). In the case of the evaluation of the IDRC/CIDA "Program on Governance", the evaluator, Sharon Sutherland, shares her doubts about being able to show evidence of the impact of the project in terms of the "smooth transition of the South African Public Service to its new structures and operating methods" (Ibid. 12).

The main issue here is that the longer the period over which programming stretches and the wider the programme scope, the more difficult it is to measure impact with any degree of authority. This difficulty lies not only with the small size of donor programmes in relation to the bigger picture, but also with the complexity of separating out the effects internal to the project and those external to it. Indeed, it often takes a long time to be able to assess the effects of a project (often longer than the time span of a project). Moreover, every governance project is inevitably influenced by factors over which it has no control, or very little control (these are the "risks" of every project): for example, the will/leadership to carry out reform by political elites, the relative lack of rule of law or the clientelist practices of civil servants in some countries, etc. (see DAC 1997: 7, 11; Dia/WB 1993). Consequently, a governance project might be well planned and implemented, but its impact not visible or measurable. What, then, is to be done? There are several possibilities:

- because of complex methodological problems mentioned above and of issues of cost-ineffectiveness of measuring longer-term and broader impacts, several government agencies in New Zealand evaluate only up to the output level of programmes; and CIDA's Performance Evaluation Division directs programmes to develop results indicators only up to the level of outcome/effectiveness, not impact (Kapoor/CIDA 1997:10). For programmes wishing impact level evaluations, large multi-donor evaluations are suggested as appropriate and more cost-effective.
- governance programmes and evaluations will need to set realistic and appropriate objectives/goals/purposes, that is, lower sites and expectations regarding the scope and effects of programmes (in terms of time, level of impact, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, risks, etc.), and define objectives clearly and consistently (Sutherland 1998:14; Kapoor 1996).
- greater reliance on the use of qualitative information, using stakeholders' perceptions of programme effects and judgments about the appropriateness of evaluation criteria, might help better narrow the scope of programming and evaluations.

(iii) **Participatory Approaches**

While section (i) above dealt with some of the donor issues of transition towards participatory approaches to governance evaluation, this section examines other constraints and implications of the approach from the point of view of both donors and recipients/stakeholders:

- even if participatory approaches to evaluation are adopted by international development organizations across the board, the question of "how much participation?" remains. Do all governance programmes necessitate the participation

of stakeholders in programming and evaluation or just some? Presumably, it would not be cost-effective to evaluate small programmes (whether one adopts participatory approaches or not). But for those programmes that do require evaluation, how much participation is appropriate? Much of the answer here will depend on the organization's commitment (in will, ideology, resources) to high degrees of participation, where stakeholders are integrated into programming and evaluation, or to low degrees, where stakeholders are consulted but not integral to programming (DAC 1993, 1997: 23-5, 74, 97; Marsden et. al 1994).

- using a participatory approach to evaluation is not necessarily easy: like it does for the donors themselves, if often requires nothing less than changing the organizational culture of the recipient organization towards one more conducive to participation. This, in turn, means larger and long-term donor commitments.
- there are a number of important risks related to participatory approaches to governance: given limited resources, it can be difficult to determine which stakeholders to include and exclude from the participatory process; sometimes reaching consensus on programme and evaluation objectives and criteria may be impossible because of a clash of interests between stakeholders (Lusthaus et.al./IDRC:24); sometimes stakeholders are not open to a participatory process: for example, civil servants negatively affected by civil service cuts may not wish to be part of any evaluation, even though their participation is crucial to measuring programme impact (DAC 1997:28). Often these risks are a measure of the extent to which all relevant stakeholders are integral to the programming process from the start (where differences can more easily be negotiated), with the risks being higher the later they join in.

(iv) **Evaluation in Governance**

It should be pointed out that evaluating discrete governance programmes (Section 2 above) and evaluation in governance (Section 3 above) are not mutually-exclusive. Just because programming evaluation in governance (establishing an auditor general's office or the rule of law, etc.) allows governance to be self-evaluating, this does not mean that such programming does not itself require evaluation. Moreover, while programming evaluation activities within governance might in theory help increase a country's overall capacity to be more transparent, accountable and efficient, it will be important to get some palpable measure of these in practice. Here, effectiveness and impact evaluations (pooling resources with other donors) would be in order.

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Annex 4

Evaluating Governance Programs
8 April 1999

Tab 3 — Annotated Agenda

General objectives for the workshop

There are many definitions of Governance. One of the most comprehensive definitions, and the one we will use as a working definition for this discussion, is provided by the Institute on Governance: **"Governance comprises the institutions, processes and traditions which determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say."** This definition implies that governance is not a distinct sector of development; it affects all sectors, and as such constitutes a cross-cutting theme. Governance, moreover, is seen as involving both public sector institutions and citizen groups.

Various definitions and conceptions of governance entail a number of governance activities or components. Participants to the workshop should take note that we are concerned here primarily with governance programs supported by international development organizations such as IDRC and CIDA. This programming is necessarily limited (in size and scope). This means that out discussions have to focus on discrete activities, rather than a country's overall governance. As a results, the task of evaluating governance does not mean evaluating all governance activities at once and comprehensively, but rather evaluating activities or programs in context of a country's needs.

Theme one: Governance

What are we trying to achieve when we put in place support for "good governance" programs?

Introduction:

Dean Toope will introduce the day by setting the conceptual framework and elaborating on the issues at stake when designing Governance activities. Then, Dr Al Johnson, who directed IDRC's "Program on Governance" in the Republic of South Africa, will lead off the discussion, speaking form practical experience.

Proposed prompting questions for session one

1. Governance support is a form of meddling, and is likely to have an impact on a country's future: some have argued that this is nothing less than social engineering. Are we fully conscious of the dangers resulting from these forays?

2. Reality is complex, yet unavoidable (!?) What does practical experience teach us? What are the limitations to our good intentions?
3. How do recipients perceive governance activities? Activity or activism? How do they view:
   - our motivations?
   - our way of doing things?
   - our concern for time, sequencing and pace?
   - our respect for their most fundamental values?
4. How long does it take to see the effects of the changes on a society? Are we sufficiently committed to the long term? Or are we pressured to act quickly? Why?

Proposed prompting questions for session two

5. We are accountable for our actions: who is the "owner" and who is the "manager"? Who decides what will be done and what should be avoided? Who is the real client of Governance support?
6. To whom are we accountable? Recipients? Or financing agencies?
7. Or is it the Parliament of Canada and Canadian taxpayers who have the last word?

Theme Two: Evaluating governance activities

How can the various actors know if and why they are moving towards the results they want?

Introduction by: Dr Kapoor, followed by Dr Sutherland. Ms Proctor will lead off the discussions. Given our purposes here and based on the survey of current literature, the introduction to our discussion will divide our task in two: (i) to examine generic approaches and methodologies for evaluation that can be (and are) applied to a range of discrete governance programs; and (ii) to examine ways of providing discrete support to evaluation within governance: for example, by establishing an Auditor General's Office to make the public sector's accounting practices more transparent, or by establishing public sector service delivery surveys to improve government services. In the long run, we will need to build the body of knowledge which is necessary to understand causal relationships which can be established between activities and results.

Proposed prompting questions for session three

8. How do we recognize progress? How do we demonstrate that actions have born results? How can we distinguish sustainable progress from fads and non sustainable changes? How do we see changes in values and attitudes?
9. If and when success is recognized, whose success is it? Is it the product of joint activities undertaken by foreign technical experts and beneficiary organizations?
10. When and how do agencies listen those they are meant to help? How do we measure the impact of our activities?
11. How can we "see" and recognize that a crisis has been averted? Do we know if Governance

programs have contributed to avoiding crisis and conflict?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the mechanisms available for generating and applying this knowledge?

Proposed prompting questions for session four

12. How do we ensure that we draw lessons from our mistakes and our successes?
13. Are lessons transmitted form one expert to another?
14. Do we really know when we make a mistake? Or when we do good? Have we developed effective means and instruments essential to feedback? What indicators of performance have we designed to measure effectiveness?
15. Do we invest what's necessary to ensure the dissemination of knowledge and results?
16. How do we report? Are successes and failures well documented and circulated? Is success defined solely by the media?

Annex 5

Evaluating Governance Programs
List of Participants

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Mr Murray Kam	Program Manager, South Africa Program, CIDA
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Mr John Lobsinger	Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Branch, CIDA
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Ms Maureen O'Neil	President, IDRC
Ms Caroline Pestieau	Vice-President, Programs, IDRC
Ms Rosemary Proctor	Special Advisor, Program on Governance
Mr Jean Quesnel	Director of Evaluation, CIDA
Mr Terry Smutylo	Director of Evaluation, IDRC
Dr Sharon Sutherland	Professor, Carleton University
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Mr Martin Ulrich	Director of Planning, Performance and Reporting, Treasury Board of Canada

Annex 6

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List of Documents for the Meeting

In addition to the literature review included in this report, the following documents were shared with participants but are not included in this report:

CIDA. Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance. 1996.

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